



MetroHUB



Heritopolis - a global consortium on metropolitan heritage

1

Anthedon²

**Gateway of the Mediterranean: the Via Maris and Incense Routes
Transboundary Metropolises for Cooperation and Peace –**

The Gaza Compendium

Introduction:

The political situation is dynamic, and multiple proposals focusing on Gaza, have been initiated, with plans being changed with every passing day. Indicated in this compendium are the many sectorial initiatives that are enumerated to develop a vision supporting cultural and natural heritage, spatial sustainability, and the metropolis. They include 13 Spatial Plans and 18 Strategic Proposals together with two overview reports and four regional plans – Palestine, Israel, Jordan and Egypt.

The critical assessment evaluates the plans and strategies and the role of the *Anthedon* initiative in creating social integration and economic revival by reducing the local stigma and regional isolation.

The top-down international energies with bottom-up local efforts create a hybrid solution with a proposal that needs to work in tandem – project and process. For this to succeed, the approach needs to humanise, providing ‘dignity’ for the individual and the communities.

We have seen in Mosul, Aleppo and now in Gaza, that the local communities are super resilient and return to their homes, set up markets, coffee bars and sport – all based on historic blocks and parcels.

<https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/soccer-returns-gaza-pitch-scarred-by-war-loss-2026-02-10/>

Women and youth are indeed the key to rehabilitation through a Vision of Hope, and based on the *Anthedon* initiative, we have identified several significant activities for women and youth in the spirit of revitalisation as a first step towards regional peace. Developing an acupuncture approach with activities that may provide added value in rebuilding a robust community, cultural and natural heritage with environmental considerations will have a major role. Details can be seen on our website www.anthedon.org

So, the support of a hybrid solution based on an economic model is particularly relevant balancing main infrastructure and affordable housing in the areas of public ownership (often the areas of the destroyed refugee camps), and the self- revitalisation of the historic urban areas that will address new and old areas alike. With an almost 100% digital economy, this may provide an innovative system to jump-start the local economies.

17 February 2026 | updated 6 April 2026

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UNI is the Universities Network Initiative of UN-Habitat; www.heritopolis.org

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Spatial Plans

Introduction


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Name:

Spatial Visioning Reflections - Gaza

Initiators and Date:

ISOCARP, December 2015



Location in Drive

Area of the plan: Gaza

Abstract:

“Our descriptions of a future Gaza region are possibilities. Such a sketch of the future can be inspiring, and can guide short term choices, including options for re-construction. Our descriptions are also predictions. We predict that the State of Palestine is likely to see the necessity of a metropolitan government to provide integrated planning and management for Palestine’s Gaza Coast. In turn, we predict that the metropolitan government will decide on initiatives such as those described below, to make the most of Gaza’s great, historic potential”.


Name:

Global Palestine Connected Gaza: A Spatial Vision for the Gaza Governorates

Location in Drive

Initiators and Date:

The Portland Trust, April 2016



This is a Palestinian Private Sector Initiative, supported by: Consolidated Contractors Company, Palestine Investment Fund, Bank of Palestine, Paltel Group Foundation, Palestine Real Estate Investment Company.

Area of the plan: Regional and Gaza

Abstract:

The Spatial Vision proposes an integrated approach to four key elements:

Urban development: Definition of type and distribution of land uses, distribution of population and employment, areas for urban intensification and new development and the location of centres.

Transportation: Proposals for sea and air connectivity, linkages to the West Bank and broader region and local public transport and road connectivity; emphasising coordination with urban development and land use.

Environment and open space: Promotion of environmental protection and enhancement, public green and open spaces and agriculture, including the relationship with water cycle management.

Energy and water: Identification of future needs and strategies for the supply of water, energy and waste infrastructure.

Spatial Vision Assumptions - The assumptions cover the four Spatial Vision timescales.

These have been defined to provide a set of useful horizons for considering the future of Gaza:

- Immediate (up to 2020)
- Short-term (2020-25)
- Medium-term (2025-30)
- Long-term (2030-50).



Name:

Open Gaza: Architectures of Hope

Location in Drive

Initiators and Date:

Terreform (Michael Sorkin et al.), March 2021



Area of the plan: Regional

Abstract:

The plan we propose also embodies a “Ptolemaic” model of the city, laying out a mechanism of cycles and epicycles that form an urban ring embracing the string of Gazan settlements and the Israeli, Palestinian, and Egyptian ones that fall within their gravitational field.

It sits in a larger system of cities that lie on an obvious ring, including Gaza City, Beersheba, Hebron, and Jerusalem. Moreover, once the logic of convenient knitting is unleashed, myriad connections are liberated. A link is created from Beersheba to Gaza and on to Nicosia, while another runs along the coast from Alexandria to Latakia. The plan is about joining, not dividing.


Name:

Economic Reconstruction & Development

Location in Drive

Initiators:

Palestine Emerging (Palestinian Reconstruction and Economic Partnership), May 2024



Area of the plan: Gaza

Abstract:

A very detailed plan about the economic development and rehabilitation of Gaza and the West Bank. The Palestine Emerging Plan outlines a model for the long-term economic development of a united Gaza and West Bank, located within a wider Levantine economic zone. The plan includes details about ideal infrastructural development, economic areas where Palestine can develop in the long run, resource sufficiency, and developing Palestinian soft power through film and sport. It also suggests novel ways of funding reconstruction such as a crowd-funded reconstruction bond, and a sovereign investment vehicle to manage donations and foreign aid.

The Palestine Emerging plan does not address any political and security issues. It consciously presumes that there will be an independent and integrated Palestine in the future that can adopt these recommendations. Further, the plan also does not detail how these projects can be realised in terms of funding, technical expertise, and existing infrastructural obstacles.

Name:

Gaza 2035: From Crisis to Prosperity.

A Plan for the Transformation of the Gaza Strip: From an Iranian proxy to the Moderate Axis

[Location in Drive - from the internet](#)

Initiators and Date:

A group of Israeli businessmen and associates, published by Israel's PMO, May 2024.



Area of the plan: Gaza and Levant

Abstract:

The “Gaza 2035” proposal outlines a three-stage master plan to establish a “Gaza–Arish–Sderot Free Trade Zone” connecting Gaza with Egypt’s El-Arish in the Sinai Peninsula and the Israeli city of Sderot. The zone would include El-Arish Port and be jointly administered by Israel, Egypt, and a proposed Palestinian body called the Gaza Rehabilitation Authority (GRA), which would oversee reconstruction efforts and manage Gaza’s finances. The plan does not propose Palestinian statehood or reference a two-state solution. Instead, by 2035, Gaza and the West Bank would come under the nominal administration of the Palestinian Authority, while Israel would retain responsibility for security within the free trade zone.

The initiative would unfold in three phases. The first phase, lasting 12 months, focuses on humanitarian aid, including what the document describes as “deradicalization” and the eradication of Hamas. The second phase would span five to ten years and involve reconstruction supervised by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, Bahrain, Jordan, and Morocco. In the final phase, Palestine would sign the Abraham Accords, signalling a form of self-rule, though without full statehood.

Economically, Gaza 2035 envisions transforming the region into a major logistics, technology, and manufacturing hub. AI-generated renderings depict futuristic skyscrapers, solar fields, desalination plants, offshore oil rigs, and a high-speed rail corridor along Salah al-Din Road. The plan proposes new east–west rail links between Alexandria and Gaza City, as well as north–south connections between Gaza and NEOM in Saudi Arabia, aligning with Saudi Vision 2030. Additional infrastructure would link Gaza to El-Arish Marine Port and El-Gora Airport and integrate the area into the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC). By leveraging Gaza’s historic position along regional trade routes, the proposal aims to attract tech firms, factories, and electric vehicle manufacturing to the new free trade zone.


Name:

The Gaza Phoenix

Location in Drive

Initiators:

Gaza Phoenix, Union of Gaza Strip municipalities, December 2024



Area of the plan: Gaza, with connectivity to the West Bank

Abstract:

The Gaza Phoenix Plan represents a comprehensive Palestinian vision for reconstruction founded on spatial justice, environmental sustainability, and community participation. It rejects externally imposed models and emphasizes rebuilding Gaza from within its social and urban fabric through three interconnected phases: emergency response, stabilization, and comprehensive redevelopment. The plan integrates key sectors such as housing, infrastructure, local economy, environment, and mobility, adopting a participatory governance model that engages municipalities, civil society, and universities as active partners.

Name:

GAZA Reconstruction

[Location in Drive - from the internet](#)

Initiators:

The Al Habtoor Group, United Arab Emirates, February 2025



Area of the plan: Gaza

Abstract:

The Gaza Strip, tragically marked by recurring cycles of conflict and destruction, faces a complex and deeply entrenched crisis that extends far beyond the visible damage to its buildings and infrastructure. The repeated devastation has crippled its economy, fractured its social fabric, and left its population in a state of perpetual vulnerability, demanding a comprehensive and transformative approach to recovery. Traditional reconstruction efforts, while necessary, have often fallen short by primarily focusing on the immediate task of rebuilding damaged structures. These efforts, though well-intentioned, have frequently failed to address the fundamental underlying economic and governance challenges that perpetuate instability and hinder long-term progress.

This report, therefore, proposes a fundamentally different approach: a three-pillar framework that integrates immediate humanitarian relief with long-term strategies for economic sustainability and the establishment of durable peace. This holistic approach recognizes that true recovery requires not only rebuilding physical infrastructure but also fostering economic opportunity, strengthening governance, and promoting social cohesion, ultimately breaking the cycle of conflict and paving the way for a more stable and a prosperous future for the people of Gaza.


Name:

New Gaza ... The Right to Peace

[Location in Drive , and from articles](#)

Initiators and Date:

Egypt adopted by the Arab League, March 2025



Area of the plan: Gaza

Abstract: The plan is premised on the need for the two-state solution, and that there is no alternative to it. Timeline for implementation:

Early recovery phase:

Duration: Six months

Estimated cost: \$3bn

Key activities: rubble removal, prefabricated temporary housing, repairs to damaged housing

Reconstruction phases

Phase I: Duration: 2 years

Estimated cost: \$20bn

Key activities: Completion of rubble removal, restoration of damaged housing, construction of new permanent housing, rehabilitation of agricultural land, development of essential infrastructure, establishment of water supply, fire-fighting systems and sanitation.

Phase II: Duration: 2.5 years

Estimated cost: \$30bn

Key activities: Continued development of infrastructure and service facilities, construction of additional permanent housing, development of industrial zones, construction of a fishing port, a commercial seaport and the Gaza International Airport.

Implementation of the first phase of the coastal road (Al-Rasheed Road), extending 10 kilometres.


Name:

A Spatial Vision for Palestine: A Long-Term Plan that can Begin Now

Location in Drive

Initiators:

RAND, April 2025



Area of the plan: Neighbourhood and Regional

Date:

Abstract:

In this report, we offer a vision for how spatial planning, infrastructure development, and resource management could better the daily lives of Palestinians now while creating a foundation on which a future independent Palestinian state could be built. We profile strategic projects that could begin immediately at the local level, even without a political solution; over time, these projects add up to the essential foundations of a future state.

We offer a spatial vision with six sectors: governance, environment, cities, transportation, energy, and water. For each, we offer a new vision, describe the current situation, suggest transformative projects and initiatives, and provide illustrative maps. Illustrative plans are shown for six existing or future cities: the North Jordan Valley, Jericho, Nablus, East Jerusalem, Hebron, and Gaza City. The analysis categorizes information from diverse sources, including extensive interviews with Palestinian, Israeli, and other stakeholders, and from multiple datasets.

Name:

EcoPeace - A Vision for the Day After

Location in Drive

Initiators and Date:

EcoPeace, July 2025



Area of the plan: Regional

Abstract:

In the aftermath of October 7, the ensuing war in Gaza, and developments in the political realities of Lebanon, Syria and the broader region, EcoPeace Middle East has developed a strategy for a prosperous and resilient Middle East. This strategy aims to utilize the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) as a means to promote regional stability and cooperation. By adding to IMEC the concept of a “Peace Triangle,” focused on Israel, Palestine, and Jordan, EcoPeace envisions fostering economic interdependencies at several levels, across sectors and across regions.

The success of IMEC is much dependent on unimpeded trade and connectivity between Asia, the Middle East, and Europe and the Peace Triangle concepts helps create the political and security arrangements needed.

Name:


The GREAT* Trust (* Gaza Reconstitution, Economic Acceleration and Transformation)
From a Demolished Iranian Proxy to a Prosperous Abrahamic Ally

Location in Drive

Initiators and Date:

Based on “Gaza 2035”, September 2025

A group of Israeli businessmen and associates



Area of the plan: Gaza and Levant

Abstract: The proposal is based on the “Gaza 2035” initiated by a group of Israeli businessmen and associates including individuals involved in creating the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF), as well as financial analysis by the Boston Consulting Group (BCG). It was circulated within the Trump administration, but never officially recognized.

The GREAT Trust proposal is structured primarily as a development and investment framework. It treats Gaza as a territory to be reorganized economically and spatially through large-scale redevelopment. The planning model is top-down, project-driven, and is structured around large flagship investments (infrastructure, tourism, tech zones, smart cities). It redesigns Gaza’s urban and economic structure from scratch and prioritizes integration into regional trade corridors and global markets (Abraham accords and the broader IMEC initiative).

Some versions include temporary or permanent relocation of residents during reconstruction phases, with “Voluntary Relocation Programs”. An “Innovative Funding Model” is proposed based on a land trust and tokenization. The plan involves converting real estate assets into digital assets and dividing them into blockchain-based tokens. Gazans would be offered the option to place their privately owned land into the Trust in exchange for tokens that grant rights to a permanent housing unit. At the same time, tokens would be issued to investors as fractional ownership shares linked to the Trust’s assets. Gazans could later redeem their tokens for ownership of rebuilt residences, and secondary trading of tokens is enabled.

Proposed to be financed by public investment which will trigger private investments and secures US-industry access to \$1.3T of rare-earth minerals from the Gulf. The project description includes “The Elon Musk Smart Manufacturing Zone”, “The American Data Safe Heaven” and the “Gaza Trump Riviera & Islands”.

Name: Gaza Peace Board Master Plan

Location in Drive - from the internet

Initiators and Date:

Gaza Peace Board Master Plan - Trump, January 2026



5

Area of the plan: Gaza

Abstract:

An undetailed plan, both spatially and textually, which treats Gaza as an empty, ready for development, real estate property. It is unclear how it will all be realized, as well as financed. Kushner stated that initially governments will finance the plan and emphasized the “amazing investments opportunities” for the private sector.

The plan includes:


- Along the seafront – a “coastal tourism zone” – up to 180 skyscrapers, many of which are likely earmarked as hotels.
- Southwest – port and zoning for an airport
- Two highlighted developments by Kushner – New Rafah New Gaza. At “New Rafah,” more than 100,000 permanent housing units would be built, along with over 200 schools, 180 cultural, religious and vocational centers and more than 75 medical facilities, with the aim that the construction would be completed within two to three years. “New Gaza” is to be a center of industry, with the aim of achieving 100% full employment. AI generated images suggest a metropolis bearing a strong resemblance to Persian Gulf cities like Doha and Dubai, with gleaming waterside accommodations and office locations.
- “Rafah Trilateral Crossing”, where the Egyptian and Israeli borders converge.
- Large areas designated as “industrial complex, data centers, advanced manufacturing”
- Large areas designated as “parks, agriculture & sports facilities”

Name: Gaza Regional Planning

Location in Drive

Initiators and Date:

Urban Design Studio in Birzeit School of Architecture, February 2026



Area of the plan: Gaza

Abstract:

A student regional-planning report for the Gaza Strip ("Principles of Regional Planning," Birzeit University, 2026). The studio assesses the context that shaped Gaza (historical-political, physical-environment, sociocultural-demographic, administrative-regional, and infrastructure-services). Different sectors were analysed, the urban spatial structure was examined, and six different visions and masterplans proposed.

Strategic Proposals

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Name: A Plan for Peace in Gaza

Location in Drive - from the internet

Initiators and Date:

Salam Fayyad, October 2023

Area of the plan:

Abstract:

A brief plan by the former Palestinian Prime Minister which essentially calls for the acceptance and implementation of the Oslo Accords. Key to this plan is the mutual recognition between Israel and Palestine along the 1967 borders, reformation of the Palestinian Authority to be a more effective governing entity (albeit necessarily with Hamas representation to prevent violence), full Palestinian sovereignty over Gaza and the West Bank, and a commitment to non-violence from both Israel and the Palestinian Authority. It ultimately aims towards a two-state solution. The future governance of Palestine, security concerns for both Israel and Palestine, future reconstruction, and the long-term economic rehabilitation of Palestine are not discussed in substantive detail.

The Fayyad plan is unique insofar as it envisions the inclusion of Hamas in future governing arrangements within Palestine out of practicality. It argues that it is impossible to eradicate Hamas and therefore to exclude them from future governance is to invite conflict between Hamas and whatever authority ends up governing Palestine.

Name: Starting from the Ground Up, U.S. Policy Options for Post-Hamas Gaza

Location in Drive1 and 2

Initiators and Date:

Israeli Policy Forum (IPF), December 2023

Area of the plan:

Abstract:

A detailed plan for postwar settlement, primarily focused on stabilising and establishing an Israel-aligned Palestinian government. It envisions a reformed Palestinian Authority taking over security and governance from the IDF in a phased manner, with the support of an international peace-keeping force drawn from Arab states. Although immediate postwar governance will be a Palestinian interim technocratic government drawn from local non-Hamas Palestinians and security will be managed by the IDF, the plan calls for the gradual transition of administration from the interim government and the IDF to a reformed Palestinian Authority which totally excludes Hamas and is composed of vetted and non-radical Palestinian experts. The exact details of this interim government will be determined at a US-convened regional conference that includes the EU and Arab states to decide upon a regional arrangement that ensures agreement on the form of the interim Palestinian government and long-term stability. It further calls for an implementable timetable for elections 1-2 years after the full transition of authority from the interim government and IDF to the Palestinian Authority.

The IPF plan also discusses the need for a US trained and vetted Palestinian Authority Security Force (PASF) which will eventually take over security in Palestine and cooperate with the IDF to permanently eliminate Hamas and other terror groups which threaten Israel. It calls for eliminating martyr payments and other support to terrorists.

The IPF plan does call for the redesignation of 10% of Area C and all of Area B to become part of Area A. If the PASF proves to be successful in managing security, the plan calls for curtailing IDF incursion into Area A as much as possible, ending settlement expansion, and releasing tax revenue collected in the West Bank to the Palestinian Authority.

The IPF plan is unique from other pro-Israeli proposals because it calls for the US to use its leverage to also force Israeli policy concessions towards Palestine to ensure a sustainable regional arrangement. It also views the UNRWA in a positive light and critical in transmitting humanitarian aid to Gaza, albeit stressing the need for reforms and gradually phasing out the UNRWA. However, the IPF plan calls for a halt to criminal proceedings against Israeli leaders in the ICC.

Name: 10-point Peace Roadmap for the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

Location in Drive - from the internet

Initiators and Date:

Josep Borrell, January 2024

Area of the plan:

Abstract:

A plan by the EU, which remains unpublished, for a future day after plan. The plan outlines the framework for peace negotiations between Israel and Palestine for an end to the conflict and a political process for establishing an independent Palestinian state. It suggests that any conference ought to aim for a one-year timeline for establishing the framework for peace.

Most points outline areas that a future peace plan will need to cover including but not limited to: Gaza reconstruction, Palestinian and Israeli security, mutual recognition between

Israel and Palestine, consent of the parties, hostage exchange, and enhancing the democratic legitimacy of the Palestinian Authority. However, the plan lacks substantive discussions about any of these topics.

Name: Gaza Futures Task Force

[Location in Drive](#)

Initiators and Date:

JINSA and the Vandenberg Coalition, February 2024

Area of the plan:

Abstract:

The JINSA/Vandenberg plan proposes the establishment of a trust which serves as an International Transitional Authority headed by the United States and Arab partners. The main goal of the trust is to engage in alleviating the immediate humanitarian crisis, manage the economic reconstruction of Gaza, and prepare and train Gazans to eventually take over governance in the future. The trust will rely upon military support from foreign states and private military companies.

The JINSA/Vandenberg plan lacks a timeline and a political vision of the future and has no substantive discussion about Palestinian inclusion in present or future government. It also lacks details about policies to achieve its various objectives, such as deradicalisation, economic reconstruction, and eventual transition to a Palestinian government; and it does not address security in substantive detail.

Name: Shaping the Future of Gaza: How Europe Could Contribute to Sustainable Stabilisation

[Location in Drive](#)

Initiators and Date:

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), February 2024

Area of the plan:

Abstract:

A European comment which focuses on a realpolitik approach to ending the current conflict. Whilst hesitating to produce a concrete plan, the comment outlines a possible political process which leverages Israeli and Palestinian interests for mutual recognition and regional stability. The SWP plan would like to see a two-state solution along the 1967 borders. It argues that a strong international commitment to a meaningful political process from the EU and the United States can be the key to ensuring fruitful negotiations.

The comment recommends that immediate postwar Palestinian governance be transferred to a technocratic government in the interim which will have the support of all Palestinian political factions including Hamas. In the long run, governance can hopefully be returned to the Palestinian Authority. The plan mainly makes recommendations for the EU to facilitate ongoing plans and suggestions of Arab states to achieve a workable regional solution, such as recent Qatari and Egyptian efforts to overcome Palestinian political infighting and establish such an interim authority.

The SWP plan makes no substantive comment about security arrangements within Palestine. Although it talks about possible European training of police and legal officials in Palestine in the intermediate term, the plan does not address the problem of Hamas or safeguarding Israeli security interests. The comment also lacks a vision and criteria for transferring power from the hands of the technocratic government to a future Palestinian government.

Name: The Road to Peace in Gaza: A Veteran Negotiator's Plan

[Location in Drive](#)

Initiators and Date:

Washington Institute for Near East Policy, February 2024

Area of the plan:

Abstract:

A brief plan drawing on the experience of an American diplomat. The Washington Institute plan emphasises the importance of a demilitarised Palestine in the future to secure Israeli agreement. It also calls for the reform of the Palestinian Authority before governance can be returned to it. Specifically, the plan advocates the total exclusion of Hamas from political power in the present and future. The plan also calls for the establishment of an international humanitarian mechanism which will collaborate with local Gazans to coordinate the supply and distribution of aid.

Although the Washington Institute plan suggests a two-state solution in the long-term, it does not establish the boundaries of a future Palestinian state. The plan readily acknowledges that there will be Israeli opposition to returning to 1967 borders and acquiesces to that opposition. It does

Name: A Humanitarian Plan for Gaza

Location in Drive

Initiators and Date:

Economic Cooperation Foundation (ECF), March 2024

Area of the plan:

Abstract:

A detailed plan for addressing immediate humanitarian issues in Gaza. It calls for expanded coordination between the Palestinian Authority, Israel, the Arab states, and the USA to more effectively deliver aid to Gaza. The plan prioritises ensuring that existing supply routes into Gaza, such as the Port of Ashdod and Kerem Shalom, are operating at full capacity. The plan also advocates for a proactive US role in lobbying for cooperation between Israel, the Palestinian Authority, and Arab states on humanitarian issues, especially in establishing rapid and effective measures at screening and distributing humanitarian aid entering Gaza. Further cooperation between all parties includes reconnecting Hamas-free parts of Gaza back to Israeli (and possibly Egyptian) power and water. The plan lacks details about the future of Palestinian governance and key security issues.

Its discussions of security are focused on preventing Hamas from expropriating aid but does not address long term Israeli security concerns. It also does not address how donor fatigue, especially from Arab states, will be overcome to secure funding for humanitarian efforts.

Name: The Day After: A Plan for Gaza

Location in Drive - from the internet

Initiators and Date:

Hudson Institute, March 2024

Area of the plan:

Abstract:

A brief plan which proposes a non-UN International Transitional Authority with the involvement of Arab states and US support. The focus of such an ITA is to ensure the immediate humanitarian crisis in Gaza is resolved and Gaza is de-radicalised. The Hudson plan aspires to exclude both Palestinians and Israelis from governing Gaza in the interim period. Instead, an advisory council of vetted Palestinian professionals will be supplementary to the governing body of the ITA. According to the Hudson plan, security will be handled by international volunteer forces and if those forces prove to be insufficient, the plan recommends employing private military contractors.

While the Hudson plan stresses that the ITA will be only an interim measure, the plan does not outline a future long-term governance structure for Gaza or Palestine. It also does not explain how the ITA will be administered, nor its legal mandate. The Hudson plan also does not address the mechanism for the termination of the ITA in the long run.

Name: The Israeli Initiative: How to turn the ongoing tragedy into a political-diplomatic turning point: A Roadmap for Long-Term Security.

Location in Drive

Initiators and Date:

Mitvim Institute and the Berl Katznelson Center, March 2024

Area of the plan:

Abstract:

A detailed pro-Israeli plan focusing on sketching out a workable political process between Israel, Palestine, the US, and Arab states towards a stable two-state solution. The Mitvim plan focuses on Israel ending future annexations, recognising the 1967 borders of Palestine, and assisting Palestine with regional economic integration. This is in exchange for Palestine recognising Israel, demilitarising and cooperating with Israel to fight terrorism, and reforming their government to eliminate extremist factions from taking power which do not recognise Israel or advocate for terrorism. This entire political process will be overseen by a modified Quartet (Russia being replaced by Arab states) that will ensure its implementation.

While the Mitvim plan is quite comprehensive, it lacks details about security arrangements. Despite advocating for security cooperation between Israel and Palestine in eliminating terrorism, it does not address local Palestinian policing forces, or Palestinian military capabilities, other than the requirement that Palestine must be a demilitarised state. It also does not address immediate humanitarian concerns in much detail.

Name: “The Day After”: The Development of the War Requires Brave Decisions

Location in Drive

Initiators and Date:

INSS, April 2024

Area of the plan:

Abstract:

Another detailed pro-Israeli plan that emphasises Israel’s security interests and international standing. The INSS plan suggests that postwar security and governance ought to remain in the hands of Israel until the Fatah, as the leader of the Palestinian Authority, can be reformed and established as a viable governing alternative to Hamas in Gaza and the West Bank. Hamas must be strictly excluded from ever returning to power politically or militarily. Israel will recognise a Palestinian Authority as ‘reformed’ only when the PA recognises Israel as a legitimate state, stops financial support for the family of terrorists, ensures Hamas is out of power, allows Israel to maintain operational control over security, and halts legal proceedings against Israel in the ICJ and the ICC. Humanitarian aid is to be brought exclusively through Israel and distributed by either Israel or the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority to enhance the legitimacy of both entities. Humanitarian aid strictly cannot be distributed by either Hamas or other foreign powers.

Although civil governance will be administered by a reformed Palestinian Authority, security will remain firmly within Israeli hands in the long-term “... similar to the situation in Judea and Samaria.” The IDF will be allowed total operational freedom and military capabilities of the Palestinian government is implied to be severely reduced under the plan. The plan also calls for the hermetic closure of the border between Gaza and Egypt so that Israel becomes the sole controller of goods and services entering and exiting Gaza.

In the event of failure by the Palestinian government to ensure this reality, the plan recommends direct Israeli military occupation until a more cooperative Palestinian government is formed which will agree to Israeli demands. However, the plan stresses that a military administration is only the second-choice option and prefers cooperating with the Palestinian Authority because Palestinian rule would secure more local buy-in and less resistance.

The INSS plan is unique because it greatly emphasises the importance of hostage return and also suggests that Israel be willing to make any concession to secure the release of remaining hostages because “Any concession that is reversible is a tactical concession, and there is no problem in agreeing to accept it.” The plan explicitly suggests that even if Israel promises an indefinite ceasefire with Hamas, Israel can always choose to continue the war later when all hostages have been secured. The INSS plan is also unique for its emphasis on the US playing a critical role in establishing and strengthening a regional order which is aligned against Iran and Iranian-backed militias.

Name: Rebuilding Gaza: Considerations for a Habitable Future

Location in Drive

Initiators and Date:

Al-Shabaka, Omar Shaban, May 2024

Area of the plan:

Abstract:

A brief plan by the Palestinian Policy Network which is anchored in ensuring local Palestinian involvement and engagement with reconstruction and rebuilding after the war. It recommends establishing a Palestinian national committee for reconstruction, composed of experts from the private sector and civil society, as well as diverse political representation. The plan stresses the importance of Palestinian leadership in any project of rebuilding so as not to build up resentment against the committee for being foreign-led and viewed as an external imposition. There is no explicit mention of whether Hamas would be included in such an arrangement, but it does call for political reconciliation between all parties including Hamas and Fatah for there to be a representative and functional political process.

The primary proposal of the Al-Shabaka plan is an incremental approach towards reconstruction. Focusing on one collection of neighbourhoods at a time, the plan hopes that the residents of these communities be proactively engaged—both in decision-making as well as in implementation—to secure local buy-in and cooperation. In the long run, the plan emphasises rebuilding Gaza’s productive sector, such as agriculture and export capabilities, will ensure that Gaza breaks out of the cycle of humanitarian dependency as swiftly as possible. However, the plan lacks substantive detail about how this long run vision will be achieved, and does not address the issue of security.

Name: The Biden Plan - the official proposal was removed from the official sites by the current administration

Location in Drive - from the internet

Initiators and Date:

Biden, May 2024

Area of the plan:

Abstract:

A brief official plan from the United States which was later adapted into UN Security Council Resolution 2735. The plan outlines a roadmap towards a permanent ceasefire, exchange of hostages, and Israeli withdrawal from Gaza. The plan leverages further American-sponsored Israeli regional integration and the return of the remaining hostages for a ceasefire, a stopping of settlements, and withdrawal from Gaza. If Hamas agrees to the conditions of the plan, there will be an international effort to rebuild Gaza and a political process to discuss the long-term status of Palestine. The US pledges ensure Israeli compliance and Egypt and Qatar pledges to ensure Hamas' compliance should the two conflict parties agree to a ceasefire.

However, the plan does not address the future governance of Gaza, security for Israel or Palestine, nor does it comment on the future status of Palestinian statehood. Although there are pledges for international support for the reconstruction of Gaza, the plan lacks details as to what the international community is willing to provide and how reconstruction would look. The plan is primarily focused on reaching a ceasefire rather than envisioning a concrete day-after order.

Name: For the day after, a 3-phase Gaza plan toward a two-state solution

Location in Drive - from the internet

Initiators and Date:

Nabil Fahmy, May 2024

Area of the plan:

Abstract:

A brief three-phase plan by the former Egyptian Foreign Minister. Phase one sees the exchange of hostages for a ceasefire and Israeli withdrawal from Gaza. This phase also sees the immediate arrival of humanitarian aid, deployment of an international peacekeeping force, and the creation of an international reconstruction fund. Phase two sees Gaza and the West Bank, along the 1967 borders, placed into a UN trusteeship authorised by the UN Security Council. Phase three sees this UN trusteeship enter negotiations with Israel, lasting one to two years, with the express intent of establishing a permanent two state solution.

The Fahmy plan offers a feasible timeline as well as a legal mechanism for its implementation. However, it lacks details about security arrangements and does not address how Israel will be brought to the negotiating table and persuaded to accept the final two state outcome within the given timeline. The plan also does not sketch a plan for what Palestine will look like after the trusteeship is terminated. There is no mention of the role of Hamas.

Name: Plan for Postwar Gaza

Location in Drive

Initiators and Date:

Wilson Center, May 2024

Area of the plan:

Abstract:

An extremely detailed plan which proposes the establishment of an International Transitional Administration (Multinational Authority or MNA), spearheaded by the US and Israel, with significant participation from the EU and Arab states. The 'Wilson' plan has the US working with a like-minded set of partners in the international community to form an international contact group that would oversee an authority that would go into Gaza to replace the IDF to provide governance for an interim transition for a non-defined Palestinian entity in the future.

The 'Wilson' plan lays out in detail the structure, goals, and strategies of the MNA, from developing mechanisms for the consultation of Gazan citizens, to deradicalisation, to the training of new security forces. The plan calls for an international peacekeeping force to take over immediate security whilst a new Palestinian policing force is vetted and trained. It argues that the Palestinian Authority is unfit for governance and transforms it into an advisory body. However, it advocates for actively involving local Palestinians with day-to-day operations of the MNA from acting as staff to local governors.

It also discusses how the MNA would aid in Gazan reconstruction in the near to intermediate term by reopening schools, opening Gaza to international banking, and supporting local businesses with subsidies. The plan suggests securing and expanding the import of aid and resources to Gaza from Egypt and Israel. It further proposes identifying non-Hamas Gazan businesspeople and supporting them with subsidies to restart the Gazan economy.

The 'Wilson' plan does not provide a mechanism for transitioning power from the MNA to a future Palestinian government. It also refrains from making any prior commitments to a political process, or comment on the future political status of Palestine.

Name: An Economic Plan for Rebuilding Gaza: A BOT Approach

Location in Drive

Initiators and Date:

Joseph Pelzman, July 2024

Area of the plan: Gaza

Abstract:

We suggest an approach based on the classic Build – Operate – Transfer (BOT) framework. The countries that invest in this project will become equity shareholders with a 50-year lease. The civil administrators that will be brought into Gaza will develop an economic model based on the principle of ‘private provision of public services.’ It will also create the common law principles known as the ‘rule of law’ as it is applied to property, contract, criminal and tort law under a market system. The sovereignty for the residents will be addressed only after the 50-year lease arrangement is complete along with the formation of a robust civil administration (e-Government) and common law paradigm referred to as ‘rule of law’ is finalized. A revitalized education system will be instituted based on a reformed UAE, Bahrain and Saudi Arabian curriculum. A computable general equilibrium (CGE) model presented in the paper will be used to track a three-sector Gaza economy (tourism, agriculture and high tech) and will be implemented to address alternative pathways for the development of this sovereign non-militarized green economy. The approach presented in this paper is a continuation of innovative thinking which was manifest when former President Trump pursued the groundbreaking and successful ‘Abraham Accords’ in complete rejection of the outdated and unsuccessful ‘Washington Consensus.’

$$X_{issn} = ad_{issn} \cdot LD_{issn}^{\alpha} \cdot KD_{issn}^{\beta}$$

| | | |
|-------|----------|--|
| where | X | Gross output |
| | ad | Production function shift parameter |
| | LD | Sectoral demand for labor |
| | α | Output elasticity wrt labor |
| | KD | Sectoral demand for capital |
| | β | Output elasticity wrt plant and equipment capital |
| | $issn$ | Index of sectors without sector-specific capital input |

Name: Gaza and West Bank Interim Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment

Location in Drive

Initiators and Date:

The World Bank, the European Union, the United Nations, February 2025

Area of the plan: Gaza



Abstract: Gaza and West Bank Interim Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment:

The Interim Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (IRDNA/RDNA) is a structured assessment of damages, losses, and recovery needs across sectors (housing, infrastructure, services, economy), designed to inform financing priorities and a recovery framework. It is not a masterplan for urban form; it is an evidence base used to sequence recovery and reconstruction programming.

This Interim Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (IRDNA)—conducted jointly by the World Bank, United Nations (UN), and European Union (EU)—provides a comprehensive analysis of the damage, losses, and needs related to the ongoing conflict in Gaza and deteriorating conditions in the West Bank. The objective of the IRDNA is to inform stakeholders of the impact in Gaza and the West Bank on the population, economy, physical assets, infrastructure, and service delivery, as well as to conduct an estimate of the needs for physical infrastructure reconstruction, economic and social recovery, and service restoration in selected sectors. The IRDNA is a next step after the Interim Damage Assessment (IDA) that was published by the World Bank, EU, and UN in April 2024, which provided a preliminary and partial analysis of the physical infrastructure damages from the conflict up to the end of January 2024 and their human and economic impacts

Name: The 'Imagine Gaza' Project – Horizon 2030

Location in Drive1 and 2

Initiators and Date:

Ofer Bronchtein, President of the International Forum for Peace, October 2025

Area of the plan: Gaza and West Bank



Abstract: This report puts forward a coherent set of proposals, including:

- Create an International Reconstruction Authority (IRA): a neutral technical body placed under the joint supervision of the EU, the World Bank, the Islamic Development Bank (IsDB), and contributing Arab countries, tasked with planning, financing, and overseeing reconstruction projects.
- Establish a bicameral governance structure: a Palestinian Transitional Civil Authority (TCA), emerging from the Cairo negotiations, would assume political management, while the IRA, as the technical arm, would ensure transparency and efficiency.
- Deploy a Multinational Stabilization Force (MSF): mandated for five years and composed of European, Arab, and international contingents, alongside the creation of a Palestinian civil security force (25,000 to 40,000 civil security personnel) responsible for securing humanitarian corridors and reconstruction zones.
- Prioritize four vital sectors: drinking water, electricity, healthcare, and logistics; restore these services within the first 18 months using modular and decentralized solutions.
- Gradually rehabilitate key infrastructure: roads, hospitals, schools, and energy networks, with the construction of a port and an airport as medium-term objectives.
- Create a Special Economic Zone: to attract investment and revive local employment.
- Implement a tripartite financial mechanism:
 1. Gaza Recovery Trust Fund (managed by the World Bank, IsDB, and EU);
 2. Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs);
 3. A voluntary global energy contribution of 0.3% on oil and gas transactions (by 2030).
- Encourage regional cooperation on water, energy, and training between Israel, Palestine, Jordan, and Egypt.
- Leverage natural gas reserves to finance reconstruction.
- Establish a "Gaza 2035" fund for reconstruction, to which 5% of regional military budgets would be reallocated.
- Involve Israeli and Palestinian civil society in governance through a digital platform Peace Book.
- Submit the official adoption of the plan to the Euro-Mediterranean Summit in Marseille (end of 2025).

This document serves simultaneously as a reconstruction plan, a governance framework, and an instrument for lasting peace.

Name: Gaza: Recovery and Reconstruction Implementation Program

Location in Drive

Initiators and Date:

Government of Palestine, November 2025

Area of the plan: Gaza, with a connection to the West Bank

Table 1: Gaza Recovery and Reconstruction Programs by Sectors

| Sectors | Number of programs | Value (US\$B) |
|----------------|--------------------|---------------|
| Social | 16 | 18.3 |
| Housing | 2 | 17.1 |
| Infrastructure | 24 | 11.5 |
| Economy | 6 | 18.4 |
| Governance | 8 | 1.8 |
| Total | 56 | 67.1 |

Table 3: Housing Sector Programs

| Sector | Number of programs | Value (US\$B) |
|---------------------------|--------------------|---------------|
| Housing | | |
| 1. Rapid shelter | 1 | 5.2 |
| 2. Housing Reconstruction | 1 | 11.9 |
| Sector Total | 2 | 17.1 |

Table 4: Infrastructure Sector Programs

| Sector | Number of programs | Value (US\$B) |
|-----------------------|--------------------|---------------|
| Infrastructure | | |
| 1. Debris removal | 1 | 1.5 |
| 2. Municipal services | 2 | 0.9 |
| 3. Energy | 7 | 1.5 |
| 4. WASH | 5 | 2.9 |
| 5. Transportation | 7 | 4.2 |
| 6. ICT | 2 | 0.5 |
| Total | 24 | 11.5 |

Table 2: Social Sector Programs

| Sectors | Number of programs | Value (US\$B) |
|-----------------------------------|--------------------|---------------|
| Social | | |
| 1. Social protection | 5 | 5.6 |
| 2. Health | 4 | 7.9 |
| 3. Education and higher education | 5 | 4.6 |
| 4. Culture and cultural heritage | 2 | 0.2 |
| Sector Total | 16 | 18.3 |

Table 5: Economy Sector Programs

| Sector | Number of programs | Value (US\$B) |
|----------------------------------|--------------------|---------------|
| Economy | | |
| 1. Agriculture and food security | 2 | 10.1 |
| 2. Industry and commerce | 2 | 8.3 |
| 3. Finance | 2 | 0.04 |
| Sector Total | 6 | 18.4 |

Table 6: Governance Sector Programs

| Sector | Number of programs | Value (US\$B) |
|------------------------------------|--------------------|---------------|
| Governance | | |
| 1. Central government institutions | 3 | 0.8 |
| 2. Local government institutions | 2 | 0.5 |
| 3. Rule of law and human rights | 3 | 0.5 |
| Sector Total | 8 | 1.8 |

Abstract:

The Government of Palestine presents its Gaza Recovery and Reconstruction Implementation Program. The Program builds upon the Arab Plan for Recovery, Reconstruction, and Development of Gaza, including its underlying political context and the urgency of preserving Palestinian rights, dignity, and the prospect of the two-state solution, which was approved by the Arab League Summit in March 2025. The Implementation Program and accompanying Portfolio of Programs present a strategic, program-level overview of the medium-term recovery needs for Gaza.

Together, they are intended to serve as a foundation for structured donor engagement, project pipeline development, and the design of more detailed interventions. The portfolio identifies 56 critical programs across five priority sectors, aligning them with national priorities and estimated financing needs.

Overviews

Name: Reconstructing Gaza through Spatial Planning: Comparative Readings of Gaza Reconstruction Plans and Proposals

Location in Drive

Initiators and Date:

Ali Abdel-Wahab, Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS), June 2025

Area of the plan:

Abstract:

This paper, prepared by the Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS), serves as a concise analytical reference on the reconstruction plans tabled to date. The paper adopts a comparative critical review of plans and initiatives developed by various entities. These are to be presented and debated within a focused group of specialists and decision-makers, with a central emphasis on spatial and reconstruction dimensions—not as merely technical matters, but as domains intertwined with political, structural, and future-oriented considerations aimed at directing the shape of life and governance in Gaza over the coming years.

Accordingly, the paper establishes a set of evaluative criteria for comparison, the most prominent of which include:

- The degree to which the plans align with Palestinian sovereignty, liberation, and national interest.
- The extent to which they address the consequences of the war.
- Whether and how they hold the Israeli occupation accountable for destruction.
- The plans' feasibility and applicability, and donor guarantees' credibility.
- The identification of beneficiaries, the developmental and economic dimensions, and how reconstruction is linked to politics.
- Other criteria are detailed throughout the paper.

Name: Postwar Day-After Plans Executive Summary

Location in Drive

Initiators and Date:

Postwar Day-After Plans - Hazem Kawasmi, January 2026

Area of the plan:

Abstract:


Many postwar day-after plans for the conflict in Palestine have emerged since October 7th, 2023. However, these plans vary greatly in their content, level of detail, and feasibility. Below are executive summaries of the most comprehensive plans and their key strategies for a postwar Gaza. A comprehensive annex is attached to this document which explores specific details of each plan in greater depth and compares them against one another. Plans are sorted by origin and an additional set of plans dealing with economic/humanitarian issues is also included.

Regional Plans

Israel

Southern District District Outline Plan - Master Plan 4/14

Links: [1](#), [2](#)



Planning goals:

1. To enable construction and development in the Southern District, based on the natural resources in the area, while promoting economic growth, as required by projections for population growth and the absorption of immigration.
2. Determine and detail the projections of changes in population distribution, the projected size of urban settlements, and the directions of their development.
3. Promote the development of infrastructure and transportation systems in the Southern District as a lever for its development.
4. To create the conditions for raising the standard and quality of life of the population, to nurture weak populations, and to integrate the Bedouin population into the development of the district.
5. To preserve the unique natural and landscape values of the Southern District, and to protect the quality of life and the environment in the district while developing it.
6. Ensure the availability of land reserves in the district for development and conservation, beyond the time frame of the plan.

Explanatory notes:

The comprehensive district outline plan for the Southern District updates the previous plan, TAMA 4 (prepared in the 1970s and approved in 1982). The plan was prepared in 1991-1993 in accordance with national development goals and TAMA 31, according to the alternative of "creating the Be'er Sheva metropolitan area" and addresses all planning issues within the district.

The plan for the district, covering an area of approximately 14,000 square kilometres (approximately 60% of the country's territory), includes the Ashkelon District (which includes the city of Ashdod) and the Beersheba District (including Eilat). The district is geographically heterogeneous, rich in natural resources in minerals and tourism, and is subject to transportation and population development, including the Bedouin population who are in various stages of transition to permanent settlement. The location of the district constitutes a land bridge with potential for international connection in times of peace.




The chosen development layout includes the thickening and consolidation of the existing settlement system, priority for the Beersheba District in a model of leapfrogging development from the centre of the country, concentration of population, services, and economic development while creating a metropolis around the city of Beersheba, consolidation of existing settlements, and development of various types of employment areas based on economies of scale, settlement regulation for the Bedouin population, and leaving the central parts and the southern regions, with the exception of the Eilat region, as an extensive and sparsely populated area.

The plan includes the development of a metropolitan centre around Beersheba, with the Ashkelon and Western Negev districts being intermediate areas of a rural nature and Eilat being a centre of growth and tourism development. Among the Bedouins, continued urbanization with agricultural neighbourhoods and as an integral part of the development of the metropolis. Additional employment centres in the Negev, Ramat Beka, Ramat Hovav and the Dead Sea. A network of roads and railways, an international airport in Nevatim. Mining and quarrying areas in balance with the needs of preserving natural and landscape values as a resource for tourism and recreation, desert and health tourism and coastal tourism. The centralized development allows for the preservation of extensive open areas.

Statutory status:

TAMA 4/14 was published for effect on 23.1.2000

Palestine



Jordan

Governerates: Aqaba, Ma'an and Tafila

Links: Aqaba [1](#) [2](#) [3](#) [4](#), Ma'an [1](#), Tafila [1](#), [Jordan 2025: A National Vision and Strategy](#)

Aqaba:


Asez's (Aqaba Special Economic Zone) vision is "a pioneering institution for a sustainable and smart zone, and a global destination for investment, tourism, and commerce." It's organized into 7 strategy pillars: Tourism, Investment, Sustainable Growth, Smart Cities, Entrepreneurship & Innovation, Skills + Local Community Development, Institutional Development.

Ma'an:

The plan's stated future direction is that Ma'an becomes more developed, more tourism-oriented, and more attractive for local/foreign investment, especially in tourism, mineral resources, and renewable energy, with the aim of creating jobs.

Tafila:

The vision frames Tafila as becoming more developed and more tourism-oriented, and also emphasizes Tafila as a source of mineral wealth, aiming to improve living conditions and create jobs.




Egypt (Sinai)

North Sinai

Link [1](#) [2](#)

The spatial plans and investment plans prioritize housing, transport and water utilities including:

- Connecting drinking-water utilities to Al-Arish International Airport
- Completing transmission lines from a seawater desalination plant (100,000 m³/day) to supply Al-Arish, Sheikh Zuwayed, and New Rafah
- Upgrading the main sewage pumping station in Al-Arish
- Upgrading/rehabilitating wastewater treatment plants (incl. Jerada East Al-Arish / Zaar' West Al-Arish)
- Completing the Rafah crossing outlet
- Rehabilitating/constructing the El-Ferdan / Bir El-Abd / Al-Arish / Rafah / Taba rail line
- Continuing development of the Al-Arish seaport
- Flood protection works
- Drilling groundwater/surface wells
- Major irrigation-network works (including large-scale network completion and intake/civil and electromechanical works; also power supply + stations + solar energy system within the “national infrastructure project for North Sinai development”)
- Hospital Development (Al-Arish, Romana and Baghdad) and pre-university education (upgrading classrooms and school rehabilitation).



Critical Assessment

Gaza Spatial Plans and the Anthedon Framework

Over the past decade, a wide range of spatial plans for Gaza has emerged, reflecting diverse institutional agendas, political assumptions, and development paradigms, thirteen of which are included in this document. These plans—developed by international organisations, regional actors, private investors, and academic institutions—demonstrate both the urgency of Gaza’s reconstruction and the complexity of its future development. While differing significantly in approach, they collectively recognise that Gaza cannot be addressed as an isolated enclave but must be understood within a broader metropolitan and regional system.

- The existing body of plans can be grouped into three principal categories:

First, **spatial-strategic frameworks**—such as those developed by ISOCARP, the Portland Trust, and RAND—emphasise integrated planning across land use, infrastructure, and environmental systems. These approaches are methodologically robust and provide coherent territorial visions though often remain technocratic and lack clear implementation pathways. Their effectiveness is also highly dependent on political conditions that are not always assured.

Second, **economic and mega-development models**—including proposals such as Gaza 2035, the GREAT Trust, and other large-scale investment-driven schemes—focus on rapid reconstruction through capital-intensive development, free trade zones, and integration into global markets. These plans offer strong financial logic and scalability, but frequently overlook local context, social dynamics, and cultural heritage. As a result, they risk treating Gaza as a tabula rasa, potentially undermining social cohesion and long-term sustainability.

Third, **locally driven and participatory approaches**, such as Gaza Phoenix and academic initiatives, prioritise community engagement, incremental reconstruction, and the preservation of existing urban and social structures. These models are grounded in local realities and emphasise social inclusion and spatial justice. However, they are often constrained by limited resources, institutional capacity, and insufficient integration into regional and global systems.

- Across these diverse approaches, several cross-cutting observations emerge:

There is a broad consensus on the importance of **infrastructure, connectivity, and economic revitalisation** as key drivers of recovery. At the same time, a persistent tension exists between top-down, capital-driven strategies and bottom-up, community-based approaches. Critically, most plans exhibit a **limited integration of cultural and natural heritage** as active components of spatial and economic development. Furthermore, a significant **implementation gap is evident**, with many proposals lacking realistic governance frameworks, phased strategies, or mechanisms to bridge immediate humanitarian needs with long-term transformation.

While the current landscape of Gaza spatial planning is rich in ideas, it remains fragmented and uneven in its capacity to deliver sustainable outcomes. There is a need for a framework that offers a comprehensive and integrative way forward. Rather than a single masterplan, a meta-framework capable of aligning and synthesising the strengths of existing approaches while addressing their key limitation is urgently needed.

- *Anthedon* – A Vision of Hope

The *Anthedon* framework address the meta-framework and offers a coherent and adaptable platform that integrates spatial planning, economic development, cultural heritage, and social inclusion. By bridging conceptual divides and aligning multiple scales of intervention, it provides policymakers with a practical and forward-looking approach to guide Gaza’s transformation into a resilient, inclusive, and regionally connected metropolitan system.

Anthedon’s primary contribution lies in reframing Gaza as an open metropolitan system, historically and geographically connected to the wider Mediterranean and regional context. This perspective moves beyond the notion of Gaza as a closed territory and repositions it as a node within broader ecological, cultural, and economic networks. By grounding regional integration in historical continuity and spatial identity, *Anthedon* provides a more resilient and context-sensitive basis for development and a future for regional cooperation and peace.

A defining feature of the *Anthedon* approach is the central role it assigns to cultural and natural heritage. Unlike most existing plans, which treat heritage as secondary or symbolic, *Anthedon* positions it as a core structuring element of the metropolitan landscape. Heritage becomes an active driver of spatial organisation, social cohesion, and economic revitalisation, linking past, present, and future within a unified development framework.

Anthedon also addresses the critical challenge of scale by integrating territorial strategies with local interventions. Its multi-scalar approach connects regional planning, metropolitan systems, and community-level actions, ensuring coherence across different levels of governance and implementation. The use of targeted, project-based interventions—described as an “acupuncture approach”—enables immediate, visible impact while supporting long-term strategic transformation.

Equally important is its capacity to bridge the divide between top-down and bottom-up models. *Anthedon* combines strategic infrastructure planning and regional visioning with participatory, community-led initiatives, thereby aligning institutional frameworks with local needs and capacities. This hybrid model enhances both legitimacy and effectiveness.

From an operational perspective, *Anthedon* emphasises phased implementation through concrete pilot projects, capacity-building initiatives, and international partnerships. Its network-based governance model—linking local actors, regional stakeholders, and global institutions—provides a more realistic foundation for implementation than many existing proposals. This is recommended through an INternational Support Team - ANTheDon, INSTANT - which will provide the academic and professional expertise, capacity-building, and strategic guidance necessary to support Gaza’s recovery.

Comparative Analysis of Gaza Strategic Proposals and the Anhedon Framework

Since late 2023, at least eighteen strategic proposals have been offered to address the future of Gaza, reflecting a wide spectrum of political, institutional, and disciplinary perspectives. These range from high-level diplomatic frameworks and security-driven governance models to humanitarian response mechanisms and economic reconstruction strategies. While collectively they represent an unprecedented level of international engagement, they remain fragmented in scope and uneven in their ability to provide a coherent, implementable, and locally grounded vision for Gaza's recovery.

- The proposals can broadly be grouped into five categories:

First are **political–diplomatic frameworks**, such as those advanced by Salam Fayyad, the European Union, and the United States, which emphasise ceasefire arrangements, mutual recognition, and the long-term objective of a two-state solution. These proposals are essential in establishing a political horizon but tend to lack operational detail regarding governance, spatial development, and implementation mechanisms.

Second are **security-driven and transitional governance models**, including those developed by the Israeli Policy Forum, JINSA, the Hudson Institute, INSS, and the Wilson Center. These plans prioritise stabilisation through international or Israeli-backed authorities, often coupled with demilitarisation and the exclusion of Hamas. While more detailed in institutional design, they frequently suffer from limited local legitimacy and unclear pathways toward sustainable Palestinian self-governance.

Third are **humanitarian and technical recovery frameworks**, such as those prepared by the Economic Cooperation Foundation, the World Bank–EU–UN joint assessment, and the Government of Palestine. These focus on damage assessment, infrastructure repair, and aid coordination. Although indispensable for immediate recovery, they are not comprehensive strategic visions and do not address the broader political or socio-spatial transformation required.

Fourth are **economic development models**, including the BOT-based proposal by Joseph Pelzman and elements of the Bronchtein plan. These emphasise investment, private sector engagement, and long-term economic restructuring. However, they often operate in abstraction from the political and social realities on the ground, raising concerns about feasibility and local ownership.

Finally, **bottom-up and civil society-oriented approaches**, notably the Al-Shabaka proposal, stress community participation and incremental neighbourhood reconstruction. These approaches offer critical insights into local engagement but lack the scale and institutional backing necessary for systemic transformation.

- Despite their differences, several commonalities emerge across the proposals:

Most adopt a **phased approach** moving from ceasefire to stabilisation, reconstruction, and eventual political resolution. There is broad agreement on the **necessity of international involvement**, both in financing and governance support. Many proposals call for reform of the Palestinian Authority and recognise the **need to transition from humanitarian dependency to economic sustainability**. A **two-state solution** remains an implicit or explicit long-term objective in the majority of proposals.

- However, the differences are equally significant:

The most contentious issues concern governance (external control versus Palestinian leadership), the role of Hamas (exclusion versus conditional inclusion), and the structure of security arrangements. Furthermore, the level of detail varies widely, from highly operational frameworks to largely conceptual outlines.

- More critically, a number of structural gaps are evident across nearly all proposals.

There is a notable **absence of a spatial and metropolitan vision**, with Gaza rarely treated as an integrated urban and regional system, and as a basis for regional peace. **Cultural heritage and identity** are largely overlooked, despite their central role in social cohesion and recovery. **Community-level engagement**, particularly involving youth and women, is insufficiently developed. In addition, most plans fail to situate Gaza within its broader regional and Mediterranean context, limiting opportunities for cross-border cooperation and economic integration. Overall, the proposals tend to compartmentalise political, economic, and humanitarian dimensions rather than adopting an integrated systems approach.

- Anthedon – a Vision of Hope

The *Anthedon* “Vision of Hope”, developed by the HERITOPOLIS network, addresses these gaps through a fundamentally different paradigm. Rather than treating Gaza as an isolated territory in need of reconstruction, *Anthedon* repositions it as an open, interconnected metropolitan system embedded within regional ecological, cultural, and economic networks. Central to this approach is the integration of cultural and natural heritage as drivers of recovery, recognising their role in restoring identity, fostering social cohesion, and supporting sustainable development.

Anthedon’s methodology is explicitly hybrid, combining top-down institutional frameworks with bottom-up community engagement. It proposes a series of targeted, scalable pilot projects—ranging from environmental rehabilitation in Wadi Gaza to heritage-based reconstruction and youth-led cultural mapping—that function as entry points for broader transformation. This “acupuncture” approach enables immediate action while maintaining strategic coherence.



A key strength of the *Anthedon* initiative lies in its emphasis on regional cooperation as a mechanism for peacebuilding. By reconnecting Gaza to historic trade routes and contemporary economic corridors linking the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and beyond, it seeks to transform geopolitical constraints into opportunities for interdependence and shared development.

Equally important is its focus on capacity building and the digital economy, particularly through the engagement of youth and women as active agents in recovery. This forward-looking perspective moves beyond traditional reconstruction models toward a knowledge-based and climate-adaptive future.

In conclusion, while the existing eighteen proposals provide valuable contributions in their respective domains, they remain partial and fragmented. The *Anthedon* initiative offers a comprehensive, integrative, and implementable framework that aligns spatial planning, cultural heritage, economic development, and regional cooperation within a single vision. As such, it represents a compelling pathway toward a resilient, inclusive, and sustainable future for Gaza.

Anthedon

Whereas multiple proposals and spatial maps have been developed, Anthedon addresses the issues of spatial sustainability and cultural heritage, in order for regional cooperation to act as a catalyst for peace and projects that create a Vision of Hope .



Initiators: Heritopolis Society

Anthedon

Date: June 2025

Area of the plan: Regional

Abstract:

Anthedon is an international initiative aimed at fostering a sustainable and inclusive recovery strategy for Gaza. This initiative, under the auspices of HERITOPOLIS Heritage and the Metropolis, a UNHabitat UNI consortium, envisions Gaza and the region as an open, interconnected metropolis, integrating advanced urban services, resilient infrastructure, and a sustainable, climate-adaptive economy. Encouraging trans-border transformations and cross-cultural dialogue is essential in recognizing the central role of culture and heritage, where Anthedon places these elements at the heart of reconstruction efforts to revitalize civic identity, strengthen social cohesion, and restore Gaza’s historical role as a key regional hub.

Gaza has long served as a strategic trade hub connecting the Mediterranean to the Middle East, with Anthedon as the ancient name of its port for over a thousand years. The city’s position at the crossroads of Africa, Asia, and Europe has historically facilitated commerce, regional cooperation and cultural exchange, as a port of the Incense Route and a key junction on the Via Maris. This legacy provides a blueprint for Gaza’s reintegration into transnational networks, linking Palestine, Israel, Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and beyond through trade agreements, shared economic corridors, environmental cooperation, and the restoration of cultural heritage. Re-establishing these connections is essential for reviving economic activity, enhancing regional stability, and fostering mutual interdependence.

This is supported by six Emergency Recovery Projects


A. Regional projects

1. Wadi Gaza Environmental and Community Rehabilitation

Goal: Rehabilitate the Wadi Gaza ecosystem, restore public green spaces, and create local employment through nature-based solutions. Wadi Gaza/Nahal Besor watershed linking Gaza, Beersheba and Hebron – World Heritage sites and IUCN – Peace Park/Natura 2000 or biosphere programmes

2. Bioregional Planning and Environmental Cooperation

Goal: Launch Gaza’s participation in a bioregional planning process to initiate ecological restoration and dialogue with neighbouring regions. Developing cross-border actions including trans-national serial World Heritage nomination for bird migratory flyways – Lake Bardawil, Wadi Gaza and Maagan Michael/Hula - Agriculture and barn-owls - climate change and coastal erosion



B. Modular projects for Egyptian, Israeli and Palestinian communities

3. Reconstruction and Rehabilitation of Cultural Spaces

Goal: Apply 'Preserve Back Better' to rebuild heritage-rich public spaces with traditional methods and community participation.

4. Emergency Heritage Skills School: Training for Traditional Construction and Conservation

Goal: Train displaced youth in traditional construction skills and link them with real restoration jobs to foster authentic rebuilding and local capacity.



5. Youth Mapping Gaza: Cultural and Natural Assets in Crisis

Goal: Train youth to map damaged cultural and natural heritage using GIS and participatory methods, supporting recovery planning and environmental awareness.

6. Gaza Cultural Memory Archive and Oral History Network

Goal: Create a digital and physical archive of oral traditions, songs, and stories to preserve Gaza's intangible heritage and empower youth in memory work.



The Strength and Strategic Value of the Anthedon Initiative

The Anthedon team, established by Heritopolis a UN-Habitat Universities Network Initiative consortium, has developed a high-value, trust-based international and regional networking platform that required long-term continuity, careful cultivation, and the ability to scale. This work was not transactional; it was cumulative, relationship-driven, and strategically positioned across diplomatic, professional, and grassroots levels – www.anthedon.org

- *Distinguished international professional record:*
Anthedon team has built a strong reputation for high-quality, credible, and professional engagement at the international level. Its work consistently reflected rigorous standards, political sensitivity, and technical competence, allowing it to operate effectively across diverse institutional and cultural environments.
- *Deep grassroots and civil society engagement in Gaza:*
The Group maintained sustained, direct relationships with non-politically affiliated civil society organizations, professional associations, and grassroots actors in Gaza and the region. Their input was not symbolic but integral at every stage of Anthedon’s work—from design and scenario building consultation to implementation and evaluation—ensuring local ownership, relevance, and legitimacy.
- *Institutional linkage with Gaza’s national administration:*
Anthedon established direct and ongoing communication with the National Committee for Gaza’s Administration, including regular engagement with its head, Dr. Ali Shauth, and four other key portfolio members. These relationships enabled alignment with local priorities and facilitated developing interventions at the operational levels. Connections have also been made with members of the Executive Board of Peace.
- *Strong bilateral engagement with Indonesia:*
The Group developed solid working relations with Indonesia, particularly at the level of the Foreign Ministry and leading academic and professional institutions. This engagement bridged diplomacy, policy dialogue, and knowledge exchange, expanding Gaza-related advocacy and cooperation beyond traditional regional channels.
- *Direct access to high-level regional decision-makers:*
Anthedon maintained direct contact with the Royal Court of Jordan, reflecting a level of trust and credibility that is rarely achieved without long-term, consistent engagement and proven institutional reliability.
- *Extensive transnational movement and network connections:*
The Group built and sustained direct links with governments, institutions, and professional networks in Singapore, Belgium, Sweden, Switzerland, the Netherlands, France, Qatar, and the European Union. Together, these connections constitute a multi-layered international network of interest, advocacy, and support for our vision and community-led ecosystem.